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COMMENTS
DNA AND LAW ENFORCEMENT:
HOW THE USE OF OPEN SOURCE DNA
DATABASES VIOLATES PRIVACY RIGHTS
CHRISTINE GUEST*
DNA testing, once an expensive and rare technology, has expanded rapidly
in the past few decades. Now, individuals can send away a DNA sample for
testing at a private company and receive a report with their ancestors’ countries
of origin and their potential for developing genetically linked diseases within a
few weeks. Individuals can even upload these test results to open source websites
in order to connect with other individuals who may be related to them. Law
enforcement has recognized the value in this technology and begun uploading
DNA samples from unknown suspects in order to solve long-cold cases,
including the high-profile “Golden State Killer” case. However, open source
DNA databases are unlike law enforcement databases. In an open source
database, there is no guarantee that an uploaded DNA profile is secure, even if
the user is supposedly anonymous. Additionally, the DNA testing technique
used to test the DNA sample reveals far more information about the individual,
including sensitive information about the suspect’s ancestral origin and
potential for developing certain genetically-linked diseases.
This Comment argues that when law enforcement uploads a suspect’s DNA to an
open source DNA database, it violates the suspect’s constitutional right to privacy.
A suspect retains a privacy interest in some kinds of sensitive information, and by
* Junior Staff Member, American University Law Review, Volume 68; J.D.
Candidate, May 2020, American University Washington College of Law; B.S., Political
Science, 2015, Drexel University. I am grateful for the hard work of the staff of the
American University Law Review, Professor Robert Tsai, and Professor Elizabeth Beske,
all of whom provided valuable assistance in preparing this piece for publication. I
would like to thank my husband, Johnathan Guest, for his support throughout my law
school career and my sister and parents for encouraging my love of learning.
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uploading the sample to a website accessible to anyone, law enforcement has violated
that privacy interest. This Comment further argues that the right to privacy of the
suspect’s family is also violated by law enforcement use of this technique. Because
DNA is shared between genetic relatives, law enforcement is also releasing
information that implicates the suspect’s genetic relatives any time it uploads a
genetic sample to an open source database.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 25, 2018, law enforcement arrested Joseph James
DeAngelo, a seventy-two-year-old resident of a Sacramento, California
suburb, for a string of rapes and murders committed in the 1970s and
1980s.1 The killer had eluded law enforcement for decades and was
previously known only as the “Golden State Killer,” the “Original Night
Stalker,” and the “East Area Rapist.”2 Shortly after the arrest, details
surfaced regarding law enforcement’s method for catching the alleged
killer. Law enforcement revealed that it had uploaded the unknown
suspect’s DNA to a DNA database called GEDmatch, an open source
website that allows users to upload their genetic profiles from
consumer genetic testing sites like Ancestry and 23andMe and make
the profiles public to other GEDmatch users.3 Law enforcement had
recovered the suspect’s DNA from evidence at several crime scenes,
and while the DNA connected the crimes to each other, the DNA never
matched any of the profiles in law enforcement’s own DNA databases.4
Officers stated that they had used the suspect’s uploaded DNA sample to
identify a biological relative and then identified other individuals in the
matched user’s family tree, ultimately leading the officers to DeAngelo.5
The arrest of the Golden State Killer was a highly public instance of
law enforcement using genetic data uploaded by private individuals to
a public DNA database, rather than using state and federal databases,
which are more commonly associated with crime-solving.6 Private use
of genetic testing has expanded rapidly in recent years, with sites like

1. Thomas Fuller & Christine Hauser, Search for ‘Golden State Killer’ Leads to Arrest
of Ex-Cop, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/25/us/
golden-state-killer-serial.html.
2. Id.; Laura Miller, How Did Police Find the Golden State Killer Suspect? Michelle
McNamara’s Researcher Has a Hunch., SLATE (Apr. 25, 2018, 10:03 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/04/paul-haynes-researcher-for-ill-be-gonein-the-dark-on-how-police-found-the-golden-state-killer-suspect.html.
3. DNA Used in Hunt for Golden State Killer Previously Led to Wrong Man, NBC NEWS
(Apr. 28, 2018, 3:45 PM) [hereinafter DNA Previously Led to Wrong Man],
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/dna-used-hunt-golden-state-killer-previous
ly-led-wrong-man-n869796.
4. See Miller, supra note 2.
5. Id.; Eric Ortiz, Golden State Killer Suspect’s Capture Sparks DNA Site Privacy Fears,
NBC NEWS (Apr. 27, 2018, 7:17 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/golden-state-killer-suspect-s-capture-sparks-dna-site-privacy-n869661.
6. See Matthew Shaer, The False Promise of DNA Testing, ATLANTIC (June 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/a-reasonable-doubt/480747
(discussing the “CSI effect,” where jurors expect to see DNA evidence in all trials).
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Ancestry and 23andMe boasting millions of users in their databases.7
Users of these services send in a saliva sample and receive test results
with information about their genetics, such as their ancestral countries
of origin.8 Users may also elect to share certain identifying information
about themselves with other users whom the testing service identifies
as possible biological relatives.9 Other sites permit users to upload
their genetic profiles and make them public to any other user of the
site.10 These public sites are open source, meaning that anyone can
access themincluding law enforcement.11
Many of the articles concerning law enforcement’s methodology
published in the immediate aftermath of the Golden State Killer arrest
wrestle with optimism for the future of this technique to identify
suspects in unsolved cases and wariness of the technique’s privacy
implications.12 Regardless of the public’s trepidation, law enforcement
has expanded upon the use of this technique, particularly in cold
cases.13 Technology company Parabon Nanolabs has offered assistance
to law enforcement in testing DNA samples for upload to sites like
7. See Jamie Ducharme, A DNA Site Helped Authorities Crack the Golden State Killer
Case. Here’s What You Should Know About Your Genetic Data Privacy, TIME (Apr. 27, 2018)
http://time.com/5257474/golden-state-killer-genetic-privacy-concerns (stating that
23andMe has over five million users); Company Facts, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.
com/corporate/about-ancestry/company-facts (last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (noting that
Ancestry has tested the DNA of over ten million people).
8. See DNA, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/dna (last visited Feb. 5, 2019)
(describing Ancestry’s consumer DNA testing services); see also How 23andMe Works,
23ANDME, https://customercare.23andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/227968028-How23andMe-works (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
9. See, e.g., Your Privacy, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacy
statement (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
10. See, e.g., GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH,
https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm (last updated May 20, 2018) [hereinafter
GEDmatch Terms of Service]; OPENSNP, https://opensnp.org (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
11. See GEDmatch Terms of Service, supra note 10 (warning users that law enforcement
may use the open source database to conduct familial searches to identify a suspect).
12. Ducharme, supra note 7 (indicating concern that even if people do not read
privacy policies stating that genetic information may be shared, the search for genetic
material is analogous to using search engines or social media—both of which have
generated serious privacy concerns).
13. See How a Genealogist Helped Police Crack an Infamous 30-Year-Old Cold Case, CBS
NEWS (July 17, 2018, 7:35 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/april-tinsley-murderpolice-crack-cold-case-with-cutting-edge-genealogy. See generally What is a Cold Case?,
NAT’L INST. OF JUST., https://www.nij.gov/journals/260/pages/what-is-cold-case.aspx
(last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (defining cold case as “any case whose probative investigative
leads have been exhausted” and noting that relatively short cases may be considered
“cold” if there are no fresh leads).
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GEDmatch,14 and many law enforcement bodies have taken advantage
of such offers to solve criminal cases.15
Any profile created by law enforcement on a public DNA database is
also public, at least to a certain degree.16 The DNA testing procedures
used to obtain the correct format for uploading to a public DNA
database are also far more “intrusive” than DNA testing traditionally
used by law enforcement.17 While the DNA tests used by law
enforcement for inclusion in government databases reveal nothing
about the individual’s ancestry or medical history, the testing
performed by commercial DNA databases is specifically designed to
provide personal information, such as the individual’s genetic
predisposition for certain diseases.18 By uploading a suspect’s DNA on
a site like GEDmatch, law enforcement is revealing a great deal of
highly sensitive data about the suspect to an unknown number of third
parties. Additionally, because DNA is shared between relatives,
uploading a suspect’s DNA profile to a public website may also share
data about the suspect’s biological relatives.19
This Comment argues that the sensitivity of the information revealed
by a suspect’s genetic profile is so great that the suspect and the
suspect’s family maintain a privacy interest in that genetic information.
As such, law enforcement violates both the suspect’s right to privacy
and the suspect’s relatives’ rights to privacy when law enforcement
uploads the suspect’s DNA profile to an open source DNA database.
While this Comment cites to several Fourth Amendment decisions, this
Comment bases its argument solely on the grounds of the right to
privacy. Any citation to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is used only
to highlight the privacy interests protected by the courts in those cases.
Additionally, while the anonymization of an individual’s data may seem
14. See Parabon® Announces Snapshot® Genetic Genealogy Service for Law Enforcement,
PARABON NANOLABS (May 8, 2018), https://parabon-nanolabs.com/nanolabs/newsevents/2018/05/parabon-snapshot-genetic-genealogy-dna-analysis-service.html.
15. See Kate Snow and John Schuppe, ‘This is Just the Beginning’: Using DNA and
Genealogy to Crack Years-Old Cold Cases, NBC NEWS (July 18, 2018, 4:30 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/just-beginning-using-dna-genealogy-crackyears-old-cold-cases-n892126.
16. See GEDmatch Terms of Service , supra note 10 (warning users of the potential
privacy implications of uploading their genetic information to the website and
clarifying that although the underlying raw DNA is modified from its original form,
the transformed data is not kept in an encrypted format).
17. See infra Section II.A.1.
18. See infra Section I.A.2.
19. See infra Section I.A.1.
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to negate privacy concerns, there is no guarantee that this data will
remain anonymous, particularly after a high-profile suspect is identified
in the media.20 Some may also argue that a suspect does not maintain a
privacy right in information revealed by crime scene DNA, but courts
have recognized a right to confidentiality for certain kinds of sensitive
information, even for individuals with reduced privacy rights.21
Part I of this Comment begins by providing some scientific
background on DNA and then goes on to describe DNA testing
techniques, focusing on the testing techniques used by law
enforcement and private DNA testing services.22 This section further
elaborates on the rise of direct-to-consumer DNA testing and the leaps
in technology that now allow DNA tests to reveal far more information
about an individual than previous DNA tests.23 Finally, Part I discusses
the development of the constitutional right to privacy and the
applicability of this right in analogous contexts.24
Next, Part II of this Comment analyzes the law enforcement practice
of uploading a suspect’s DNA to a publicly available DNA database in
the context of the applicable law discussed in Part I. Section II.A
discusses the privacy rights of a suspect and argues that some of the
information contained within an individual’s DNA implicates sensitive
information about the individual’s health and genetic background.
Therefore, law enforcement violates a suspect’s right to privacy by
uploading the DNA profile to a website where the public can
potentially access the information. Section II.B discusses the privacy
rights of a suspect’s family members. This section argues that the
information contained in a suspect’s DNA can also reveal sensitive
information about a suspect’s family members. Because uploading the
DNA profile implicates the privacy rights of innocent third parties, law
enforcement is therefore obligated to keep this information confidential.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

The Basics of DNA and DNA Testing

A basic understanding of the science of DNA is essential to
understand how law enforcement uses DNA to identify suspects in cold

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See infra Section I.C.2.
See infra Section I.D.2.
See infra Sections I.A, I.B.
See infra Section I.C.
See infra Section I.D.
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cases. This section will address several important points, including what
DNA is, how related individuals share DNA, and how scientists test DNA.
1.

DNA and shared biological characteristics
DNA stands for “deoxyribonucleic acid,” and is found in most cells of
the body of a living thing.25 DNA is essentially a “blueprint” that tells the
body how to make different types of proteins.26 To form this “blueprint,”
DNA has four “bases” called adenine (A), cytosine (C), guanine (G),
and thymine (T).27 These bases match up with one another to form the
unique twisted ladder shape of a DNA molecule, known as a “double
helix.”28 The bases always match with a particular counterpart (A always
matches with T and C always matches with G) to form a “base pair.”29
DNA coils itself into compact structures called chromosomes, which are
stored in the nucleus of the cell.30 Most cells in the human body contain
forty-six chromosomes, each made of tightly compacted DNA.31
Collectively, all of the information contained within an individual’s DNA
is called the individual’s “genome.”32 The genome of one individual
human contains approximately 3.2 billion base pairs.33 DNA is also able
to make copies of itself, which allows cells to divide and form new cells
with the same exact DNA.34
DNA is a hereditary material, meaning that it is passed down from
parents to their biological children.35 Hereditary information concerns
both “phenotype,” the physical manifestation of a genetic trait, and
“genotype,” the underlying genetic code that informs the creation of the
trait.36 A biological child, however, can inherit traits from a parent that
25. What is DNA?, NIH, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF MED.: GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (July
17, 2018) [hereinafter What is DNA?], https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/basics/dna.
26. A. JAMIE CUTICCHIA, GENETICS: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS 16 (2d ed. 2018).
27. What is DNA?, supra note 25.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. CUTICCHIA, supra note 26, at 5.
31. Id. at 5, 9. Additionally, some individuals can have more or less than forty-six
chromosomes, a condition known as aneuploidy, which is often connected to other
genetic diseases. See id. at 11.
32. Id. at 8.
33. Id.
34. What is DNA?, supra note 25.
35. See, e.g., Anthony J.F. Griffiths et al., DNA: The Genetic Material, in AN
INTRODUCTION TO GENETIC ANALYSIS 260 (2000); Timothy Newman, What is DNA and
How Does it Work?, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.medicalnew
stoday.com/articles/319818.php.
36. CUTICCHIA, supra note 26, at 19–20.
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the parent does not outwardly demonstrate.37 This is because the child’s
parents may have passed down DNA with recessive genes, which are only
expressed when the child does not inherit a dominant gene from a parent.38
Because a child inherits DNA from both parents, who in turn inherited
their DNA from their parents, and so on, each person shares DNA not
only with his parents, but also with other biologically related members of
his family. Closely related individuals usually share a significant amount
of DNA with one another.39 However, with the exception of the parentchild relationship, the exact amount of shared DNA between related
individuals varies depending on how close the genetic relationship is
between the two individuals.40 The closer the genetic relationship
between the two individuals, the more likely they are to share a significant
amount of DNA.41 However, at some point when two individuals are very
distantly related, they may not share any DNA at all.42
2.

Identifying individuals using DNA
DNA is unique to each individual.43 Therefore, by testing DNA,
scientists can compare a DNA sample from an unknown individual to
DNA from known individuals to try and find a match.44 To match one
sample of DNA to another, scientists can create a “DNA fingerprint,”
which isolates certain elements of the DNA in a sample to create a

37. Id. at 20–21.
38. Id.
39. CeCe Moore & Henry Louis Gates Jr., How Much DNA Do Distant Cousins
Actually Share?, THE ROOT (Nov. 14, 2014, 3:00 AM), https://www.theroot.com/howmuch-dna-do-distant-cousins-actually-share-1790877726.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. With modern testing techniques used by consumer DNA testing services, true
third cousins are read as unrelated to one another approximately ten percent of the
time because they may not have received any of the same DNA from their shared
second-great-grandparents. Id.
43. See CUTICCHIA, supra note 26, at 29 (discussing genetic variation in humans).
While some often believe that identical twins, because they come from the same egg
which splits in utero to create two individuals, have identical DNA, recent studies have
demonstrated that even identical twins have some small genetic variations. See Peter
Miller, A Thing or Two About Twins, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC MAG. (Jan. 2012),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2012/01/identical-twins-sciencedna-portraits (stating that identical twins share almost identical DNA).
44. See CUTICCHIA, supra note 26, at 81–85 (describing early and more modern
methods for comparing samples of DNA in forensic analysis).
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unique profile that can then be matched to other DNA samples.45 To
create a DNA fingerprint, the scientist must first have a sample to work
from.46 This sample can be from any DNA-containing material,
including blood, saliva, or skin.47
Once the scientist has a sample, he may choose from a variety of
testing methods to create a DNA fingerprint. While older methods of
DNA testing required a significant amount of DNA, the same is not true
of more modern techniques. With modern DNA testing, even small
amounts of DNA and degraded DNA can be tested using the polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) technique.48 PCR replicates certain sequences
within the DNA molecule to create enough DNA material to test.49
After a scientist has enough genetic material to test, there are a
couple different modern testing methods that he can use to create the
DNA fingerprint. One method is to test for “short tandem repeats”
(STRs) within the DNA sample.50 These STRs can repeat dozens or
hundreds of times throughout the individual’s genome, and the
number of times STRs repeat varies from person-to-person.51 Testing
a variety of STRs can provide the scientist with enough unique
information to reliably identify an individual.52 STRs are not genes, so
they do not reveal much information about the individual; however, by
testing for enough STRs, a scientist can create a profile that can be
compared to other DNA samples for identity purposes.53
Another method of testing DNA is to test for single-nucleotide
polymorphisms (SNPs). SNPs do not vary as much as STRs, but by
testing for enough SNPs, the scientist can create a reliable DNA
fingerprint for an individual.54 SNPs do, however, indicate what a
45. Editors of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, DNA Fingerprinting, ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA https://www.britannica.com/science/DNA-fingerprinting (last visited
Feb. 5, 2019) [hereinafter DNA Fingerprinting].
46. Id.
47. See CUTICCHIA, supra note 26, at 50–53 (describing methods of collecting DNA,
including blood draws, saliva collection, and sampling shed skin cells).
48. Id. at 50–53, 88–90 (describing how PRC techniques operate); DNA
Fingerprinting, supra note 45.
49. DNA Fingerprinting, supra note 45.
50. Id.
51. CUTICCHIA, supra note 26, at 85; Sarah Zhang, How a Tiny Website Became the
Police’s Go-To Genealogy Database, ATLANTIC (June 1, 2018), https://www.theatlanti
c.com/science/archive/2018/06/gedmatch-police-genealogy-database/561695.
52. See Zhang, supra note 51.
53. Id.
54. Id. (stating that with enough SNPs one can “trace the geographic origins of
ancestors and find distant relatives”).
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person’s ancestry may be, and can provide insight into the individual’s
probable eye color, race, and geographic ancestry.55 SNPs can also
provide insight into an individual’s medical history by showing the
individual’s susceptibility to certain genetically-linked diseases.56
Finally, a scientist may choose to “sequence” the DNA that he is
testing.57 Sequencing is more comprehensive than SNP or STR testing
and involves determining the exact sequence of all or a portion of an
individual’s genome.58 However, this technology can be expensive and
is therefore often unavailable on a large scale.59 The price of this
technology continues to fall, however, and the National Institute of
Health’s National Human Genome Research Institute aims to one day
bring the cost of this testing technique to under $1,000.60
B.

Law Enforcement DNA Collection and Retention

DNA testing was introduced relatively early in legal disputes to solve
crimes and determine paternity.61 However, the large amount of DNA
needed for early techniques limited the use of DNA testing in most
cases.62 Today, law enforcement has extensive procedures and resources
for using DNA to solve crimes.63 The Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) maintains a national database known as the Combined DNA
Index System (CODIS), which also includes a network of state databases
and federal databases maintained by other federal entities, known as the

55. Id.
56. Tina Hesman Saey, What Consumer DNA Data Can and Can’t Tell You About Your
Risk for Certain Diseases, SCI. NEWS (June 3, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.sciencenews.org/article/health-dna-genetic-testing-disease (discussing
how genetic testing services can now test for risks related to certain genetic diseases).
57. See Anthony J.F. Griffiths, DNA Sequencing, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/science/DNA-sequencing (last visited Feb. 5, 2019)
(explaining DNA sequencing and the development of sequencing technology).
58. What Is the Difference Between Genotyping and Sequencing?, 23ANDME,
https://customercare.23andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/202904600-What-is-the-differ
ence-between-genotyping-and-sequencing (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
59. Id.
60. DNA
Sequencing,
NIH:
NAT’L
HUM.
GENOME
RES.
INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/10001177/dna-sequencing-fact-sheet (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
61. DNA Fingerprinting, supra note 45.
62. Id.
63. See Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology: Using DNA to Solve Crimes, DEP’T
JUST. ARCHIVES (last updated Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/archives/
ag/advancing-justice-through-dna-technology-using-dna-solve-crimes.
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National DNA Index System (NDIS).64 States also frequently have their
own internal databases.65 Whose DNA goes into the database and how
that DNA is retained, used, and tested has been the subject of much
litigation.66 This section discusses how law enforcement tests and stores
data, who law enforcement may take DNA from, and how law
enforcement uses familial DNA testing within its own databases.
1.

Law enforcement DNA databases
With the expansion of DNA technology, law enforcement has now
created DNA databases for internal use to solve crimes and locate
criminals. On the federal level, there is CODIS.67 CODIS is operated
by the FBI, along with NDIS, which has 190 participating local
laboratories around the country.68 CODIS stores the DNA information
of convicted offenders, some arrestees, and DNA samples from crime
scenes.69 CODIS is a federal database, but information from state DNA
laboratories is also uploaded to CODIS through the NDIS partnership
with local laboratories.70 Initially, CODIS tested DNA at thirteen
particular locations, known as loci, but the FBI added seven more loci
in January 2017 to ensure the accuracy of DNA matches as the number
of profiles uploaded to CODIS increased.71 The loci tested for the
CODIS database are in non-coding regions of an individual’s DNA,
meaning that they only establish a code that can be used to identify the
individual and do not implicate any additional information about the

64. Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fac
t-sheet [hereinafter CODIS and NDIS FAQs] (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
65. See Jason Kreag, Going Local: The Fragmentation of Genetic Surveillance, 95 B.U. L.
REV. 1491, 1500–01 (2015) (discussing the expansion of state and local DNA databases
and the privacy implications of this trend).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 251 (4th Cir. 2012) (examining
the constitutionality of police retention of a DNA sample collected from an individual
when he was previously a crime victim and the subsequent creation of a DNA profile
to investigate him as a murder suspect); People v. Buza, 413 P.3d 1132, 1135 (Cal.
2018) (upholding a California law that requires police to collect DNA samples from
those arrested for or convicted of felony offenses).
67. CUTICCHIA, supra note 26, at 86.
68. Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis (last visited Feb. 5,
2019). The locations tested in a DNA test are commonly known as “loci.” Id.
69. CUTICCHIA, supra note 26, at 86.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 8687.
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individual’s appearance, ancestral origin, or medical information.72
State and local law enforcement have their own databases as well.73
While state and local DNA databases were usually created to retain the
DNA data of sex offenders, these databases have expanded to include
other DNA profiles.74 State databases also may be far broader and
more inclusive of other DNA samples outside of what the state uploads
to the federal system, NDIS.75
2.

Collection of DNA for inclusion in law enforcement databases
To maintain its databases, law enforcement must collect DNA from
individuals. The FBI is authorized to create a DNA index consisting of
DNA from “persons convicted of crimes,” “persons who have been
charged in an indictment or information with a crime,” and “other
persons whose DNA samples are collected under applicable legal
authorities, provided that DNA samples that are voluntarily submitted
solely for elimination purposes shall not be included in the National
DNA Index System.”76 The FBI is also authorized to include in the
DNA index samples from crime scenes, unidentified human remains,
and samples provided voluntarily by the relatives of missing persons.77
The law also provides that to be included in CODIS, the DNA analyses
must come from laboratories or state, local, or federal agencies that
meet certain guidelines and, in the case of external laboratories,
undergo external audits.78
A more controversial measure has been the inclusion of the DNA of
individuals arrested for certain crimes in law enforcement DNA
databases. In Maryland v. King,79 the Supreme Court of the United
72. Id. at 87–88.
73. See Kreag, supra note 65, at 1492. For an interesting discussion of the
regulatory problems with state and local DNA databases, see Stephen Mercer & Jessica
Gabel, Shadow Dwellers: The Underregulated World of State and Local DNA Databases, 69
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 639, 691–94 (2014), noting that state DNA databases are
largely unregulated in some states, and that DNA of victims is sometimes retained in
the database despite the fact that the victim did not commit a crime.
74. See Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, The Expanding Use of DNA in Law
Enforcement: What Role for Privacy?, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 153, 153–54 (2006) (explaining
the expansion of local DNA databases).
75. See Mercer & Gabel, supra note 73, at 654–55 (describing the variation in state
practices for what to include in the state’s own database, and how what the state
includes in its own database may differ from what the state uploads to NDIS).
76. 34 U.S.C. § 12592(a)(1) (Supp. V 2017) (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14132).
77. § 12592(a)(2)–(4).
78. § 12592(b).
79. 569 U.S. 435 (2013).
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States held that a Maryland law permitting police officers to take DNA
samples from individuals arrested for, but not convicted of, serious
crimes was permissible under the Fourth Amendment.80 The Maryland
law permitted the collection of DNA from individuals arrested for
committing a burglary or crime of violence, or attempting to commit
a burglary or crime of violence.81 Since the King decision, the federal
government has also authorized the collection of DNA from individuals
who have been “arrested, facing charges, or convicted” of a crime and
individuals who are on “probation, parole, or supervised release.”82
3.

Familial DNA testing in law enforcement DNA databases
The federal government does not explicitly authorize familial DNA
testing within its NDIS databases.83 However, the FBI may perform a
“moderate stringency search” of the NDIS system, which can be used
to search the DNA database for a match to a sample that contains DNA
from multiple individuals or is partially degraded.84 Moderate
stringency searches can also allow scientists to account for variations
across different laboratories.85 Law enforcement may use these
moderate stringency tests to capture DNA profiles in the database that
contain the same DNA as the sample but that might not show up on a
higher stringency test.86 For example, a moderate stringency search
may help law enforcement by matching a suspect’s DNA to partially

80. Id. at 465. In King, the Court found that,
In light of the context of a valid arrest supported by probable cause respondent’s
expectations of privacy were not offended by the minor intrusion of a brief swab
of his cheeks. By contrast, that same context of arrest gives rise to significant
state interests in identifying respondent not only so that the proper name can
be attached to his charges but also so that the criminal justice system can make
informed decisions concerning pretrial custody. Upon these considerations the
Court concludes that DNA identification of arrestees is a reasonable search that
can be considered part of a routine booking procedure.
Id.
81. Id. at 443.
82. 34 U.S.C. § 40702(a) (Supp. V 2017) (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a);
see also Mercer & Gabel, supra note 73, at 652–53 (discussing how both federal and state
governments have expanded DNA collection procedures).
83. CODIS and NDIS FAQs, supra note 64.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id. (defining a high stringency test as one “that requires all alleles to match”
between the sample and database profile, while defining a moderate stringency test as
one “requires all alleles to match, but [the sample and database profile] can contain a
different number of alleles”).
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degraded DNA the same suspect left at a previous crime scene.87 There
is also a possibility that these moderate stringency tests may return a
“partial match” result between two single source samples—two samples
that are each known to include only one individual’s DNA. Such a
result can indicate that the contributors of the two samples may be
biologically related to one another, although the FBI notes that the
likelihood of a true familial relationship based on a moderate
stringency test is low.88 The FBI may choose to disclose the partial
match, and thus a possible familial relationship, to the law
enforcement agency conducting the search.89 However, the FBI
considers the reporting of these partial matches not to be the same as
familial DNA testing, as the test was not an “intentional or deliberate
search” with the purpose of finding related individuals.90
In some states, law enforcement uses familial DNA testing within its
own databases.91 Twelve states have used familial DNA testing in their
own DNA databases to track down suspects: Arizona, California,
Colorado, Florida, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming.92 Very few of these laws have been
challenged so far, and courts have generally not answered the question
about the implications of familial DNA testing on an individual’s
relatives.93 Two jurisdictions, the District of Columbia and Maryland,
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.; see also FBI LAB., NAT’L DNA INDEX SYSTEM (NDIS) OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE
MANUAL 82–84 (2016),
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ndis-operational-procedures-manual.pdf
(detailing the NDIS “plan” for releasing the results of a partial match).
90. CODIS and NDIS FAQs, supra note 64.
91. James Rainey, Familial DNA Puts Elusive Killers Behind Bars. But Only 12 States
Use It., NBC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2018, 6:00 AM) https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/familial-dna-puts-elusive-killers-behind-bars-only-12-states-n869711.
92. Id.; see also Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109
MICH. L. REV. 291, 302–03 (2010) (stating that while some states have formally codified
the practice of familial searching in law, other jurisdictions sometimes perform familial
searches without statutory authorization).
93. See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 412–13 (3d Cir. 2011)
(distinguishing DNA samples, which the court said do contain genetic information
about an individual’s family, from DNA profiles entered into CODIS, which the court
said reveal only the individual’s identity, and not addressing the question of privacy in
these samples); State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 34 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (noting that
while it may be true that DNA contains information about an individual’s family and
may constitute a privacy interest, the use of DNA in the case presented a narrower
question and therefore the court made no decision regarding privacy interests in
DNA). But see Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 423–24 (Rendell, J., dissenting) (stating that the
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explicitly forbid the use of familial DNA testing in state databases.94 In
academic circles, many argue that familial DNA testing violates Fourth
Amendment protections and invades the privacy rights of individuals.95
C.

The Rise of Consumer Genetic Testing and Public DNA Databases

In recent years, DNA testing has become cheaper and expanded into
other markets. Several private DNA testing companies have established a
market for direct-to-consumer genetic tests, which provide users with
information about their ancestry, potential for developing a geneticallylinked disease, and carrier status for certain diseases that the user may pass
on to his children.96 This section explores the rapid expansion of these
private genetic testing services, the establishment of public DNA
databases, and how law enforcement has increasingly used this technology
to solve cold cases.
1.

Direct-to-consumer genetic testing services
Direct-to-consumer genetic testing services first appeared in the early
2000s but have rapidly become more accessible because of price
reductions.97 Direct-to-consumer DNA tests have risen drastically in
popularity in recent years, and they are expected to continue to grow.98
majority ignores the vast amount of sensitive genetic information in an individual’s
DNA sample, which is usually retained by the government).
94. D.C. CODE § 22-4151(b) (2018); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-506(d) (West
2018).
95. See Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds: A Genetic Tattle Tale Based
on Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 4–5 (2010) (cautioning the use of
familial DNA testing and identifying potential problems); Trevor Woodage, Note,
Relative Futility: Limits to Genetic Privacy Protection Because of the Inability to Prevent
Disclosure of Genetic Information by Relatives, 95 MINN. L. REV. 682, 708–09 (2010)
(identifying ways to prevent abuse of familial DNA testing). But see David H. Kaye, The
Genealogy Detectives: A Constitutional Analysis of “Familial Searching,” 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
109, 113 (2013) (arguing that properly implemented familial DNA searching is a
valuable tool for law enforcement).
96. See, e.g., Our Services: Health + Ancestry, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/dnahealth-ancestry (last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (explaining the wide range of ancestry and medical
tests 23andMe may perform on an individual’s DNA sample).
97. Antonio Regalado, 2017 Was the Year Consumer DNA Testing Blew Up, MIT TECH.
REV. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610233/2017-was-the-yearconsumer-dna-testing-blew-up (discussing the price war between consumer genetic
testing companies); see also Our Story, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/corporate/
about-ancestry/our-story (last visited Feb. 5, 2019); About Us, 23ANDME,
https://mediacenter.23andme.com/company/about-us (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
98. Mark Williams, The Lucrative Rise of DNA Testing: ‘We Created the Market for What
We Do,’ GUARDIAN (May 25, 2017, 2:00 AM) https://www.theguardian.com/small-
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Ancestry, the largest consumer DNA database, now boasts that it has
tested approximately 10 million people’s DNA.99 The consumer DNA
testing industry has also moved beyond testing for ancestry and now offers
other services, such as DNA-specific skincare and fitness routines.100 Many
companies can now offer their genetic testing services for under sixty
dollars.101 The industry took off in the summer of 2016, rapidly
expanding from about 2.5 million people tested across the industry to
over 12 million people in 2018.102
Of the largest companies in the direct-to-consumer DNA testing
market, most perform “autosomal” DNA testing to test consumers’
DNA samples.103 Autosomal DNA is the DNA not involved in sex
determination.104 Generally, most companies perform SNP testing as
outlined above, testing particular single-nucleotide polymorphisms
that indicate a person’s ancestral origin.105 Direct-to-consumer tests
include a large number of SNPs in their testing process.106 For
instance, Ancestry purports to test the person’s “entire genome at over
700,000 locations.”107 To determine an individual’s ancestral origins,
these tests compare the individual’s DNA sample with other DNA
samples to estimate an individual’s ancestral background.108 The
advantage to using SNP testing is that it captures the individual’s entire
genetic background, instead of only certain family genetic lines.109
This more comprehensive type of testing also allows the industry to
offer many more types of DNA analyses, including everything from diet

business-network/2017/may/25/dna-testing-we-created-the-market-for-what-we-doliving-dna-dnafit-geneu (noting that the consumer genetic testing industry was worth
$70 million in 2015 but is expected to be worth $340 million by 2022).
99. Company Facts, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/corporate/aboutancestry/company-facts (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
100. Williams, supra note 98.
101. Regalado, supra note 97.
102. Id.
103. The Pros and Cons of the Main Autosomal DNA Testing Companies, DNA GEEK (Nov.
13, 2016), http://thednageek.com/the-pros-and-cons-of-the-main-autosomal-dnatesting-companies.
104. CUTICCHIA, supra note 26, at 223.
105. Zhang, supra note 51.
106. What is Genetic Ancestry Testing?, NIH, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED.: GENETICS HOME
REFERENCE, https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/dtcgenetictesting/ancestrytesting (last
visited Feb. 5, 2019).
107. AncestryDNA—Frequently Asked Questions, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/
dna/en/legal/us/faq#about-3 (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
108. What is Genetic Ancestry Testing?, supra note 106.
109. Id.
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recommendations to advice regarding genetic health risks.110 While
this Comment addresses privacy rights in the context of open source
DNA databases, privately maintained DNA databases have also
grappled with privacy rights concerns.111
2.

Open source DNA databases
Some DNA databases provide open source access to DNA profiles,
including the now-famous GEDmatch used in the Golden State Killer
investigation.112 GEDmatch allows users to upload their DNA data
generated by an earlier DNA test from a consumer genetic testing service
like Ancestry or 23andMe.113 When GEDmatch users upload their genetic
profile to the site, they have the option to designate the genetic profile as
“private,” “public,” or “research.”114 Private DNA “is “available for
comparison to any Raw Data in the GEDmatch database using the various
tools provided for that purpose.”115 Research DNA may be used for a
“one-to-one comparison to other Public or Research DNA.”116
GEDmatch notes that it does not guarantee the “confidentiality of
any communication, material, or personal information provided to
GEDmatch via the Site or email.”117 The site also provides the following
information about what happens to data once it is uploaded to the site:
The original Raw DNA and GEDCOM data you provide to
GEDmatch is not kept in its original form. It is converted to a form
that makes it more efficient for the software to perform searches and
comparisons. The Genealogical Data is loaded into a relational
database that might still be recognizable as text. The Raw DNA is
converted to a compressed binary format in a process we call
“tokenization.” Although the Raw DNA is not encrypted in the usual
sense of the word, it would be very difficult for a human to read it.
110. See Regalado, supra note 97 (noting that there is little oversight of a growing
sector which offers to “reanalyze” genetic data and provide products or services based
on an individual’s genetic makeup).
111. Maggie Fox, What You’re Giving Away with Those Home DNA Tests, NBC NEWS
(Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/what-you-re-givingaway-those-home-dna-tests-n824776.
112. Vera Eidelman, The Creepy, Dark Side of DNA Databases, WASH. POST (May 8,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-creepy-dark-side-of-dna-datab
ases/2018/05/08/279e9c2c-5230-11e8-abd8-265bd07a9859.
113. Julian Hattem, Investigators Say DNA Database Can Be a Goldmine for Old Cases,
AP (June 16, 2018) https://www.apnews.com/96ee418316c343649df5d10d2a44c600.
114. GEDmatch Terms of Service, supra note 10.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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Original uploaded files are deleted from the Site servers soon after
they are processed and archived.118

GEDmatch also notes that it cannot guarantee users will not access the
site for purposes other than genealogical research.119 GEDmatch states
that users of the site may discover another user’s identity (even if that
user has attempted to obscure the information), genetic relationships
between individuals, or medical information.120 Additionally, the site’s
user agreement now states that law enforcement may upload DNA to
“identify a perpetrator of a violent crime against another individual” or
“identify remains of a deceased individual.”121 There is no indication as
to how GEDmatch polices or enforces this rule.
3.

Law enforcement use of private and public databases
In the Golden State Killer investigation, law enforcement found a
particularly well-preserved sample of DNA from one of the crime
scenes believed to be connected to the serial killer.122
Law
enforcement uploaded the DNA data of the suspect’s sample to
GEDmatch and obtained a partial match to an individual that law
enforcement believed to be a relative of the suspect.123 GEDmatch was
unaware of this use of its website, and affiliates of the company state that
law enforcement use was not part of the concept of the website itself.124
Once a law enforcement agency has a partial match to a suspect’s
profile on a public DNA database, they can use this information to
identify likely suspects. Law enforcement can construct the family tree
of the matched individual through public records to identify related
individuals who fit the profile of the suspect.125 Once law enforcement
has narrowed down the search of the family tree to a particular

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. (defining “violent crime” as “homicide or sexual assault”).
122. Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden State Killer is Tracked Through a
Thicket of DNA, and Experts Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes
.com/2018/04/27/health/dna-privacy-golden-state-killer-genealogy.html.
123. Id.
124. See id. (explaining that, at the time they uploaded their sample, law
enforcement had to certify “that the DNA was their own or belonged to someone for
whom they were legal guardians,” or that they had received permission to upload the
DNA).
125. Heather Murphy, Technique Used to Find Golden State Killer Leads to a Suspect in
1987 Murders, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/1
8/science/ancestry-site-arrest-washington.html.
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individual, law enforcement may choose to get a warrant for a genetic
sample from the suspect.126 However, under the law established in
California v. Greenwood,127 law enforcement may also obtain the suspect’s
DNA without a warrant.128 In the Golden State Killer investigation, law
enforcement used DNA found on items that DeAngelo had discarded
and on public surfaces he had recently touched to determine that he
was a match to original crime scene DNA.129
Since the success in the Golden State Killer case, law enforcement
agencies in other jurisdictions have used GEDmatch in other cases to
turn up familial matches to unknown DNA samples left by suspects at
crime scenes.130 GEDmatch’s website now warns users that law

126. See DNA Previously Led to Wrong Man, supra note 3 (stating that law enforcement
did obtain a warrant in the Golden State Killer investigation to obtain the DNA of
another man, who was ruled out as a suspect after DNA testing).
127
486 U.S. 35 (1988).
128. See DNA From Tissue in Trash Led to Arrest in Golden State Killer Case, Records Show,
CBS
NEWS
(June
1,
2018)
[hereinafter
Tissue
Led
to
Arrest],
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/dna-from-tissue-in-trash-led-to-arrest-in-goldenstate-killer-case-records-show (reporting how police tracked DeAngelo by first
obtaining a DNA sample from a door handle, and then obtaining another sample from
a tissue in DeAngelo’s trash); see also Aaron Keller, How ‘Discarded DNA’ Helped Cops
Legally Catch the Suspected Golden State Killer, LAW & CRIME (Apr. 25, 2018, 5:01 PM),
https://lawandcrime.com/high-profile/how-discarded-dna-helped-cops-legally-catchthe-suspected-golden-state-killer (discussing how police did not need to obtain
warrants for the DNA samples collected from DeAngelo prior to his arrest because
DNA that has been “discarded” by the individual does not receive the same Fourth
Amendment protections as DNA taken directly from an individual). Warrantless
searches of an individual’s discarded trash were held to be constitutional in California
v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988), but the Supreme Court has declined to rule on
the constitutionality of testing “discarded” DNA. See Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753 (Md.
2014), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 1509 (2015). Multiple state courts have upheld this
practice, while federal courts have generally taken a more cautious approach. See, e.g.,
Schmidt v. Stassi, 250 F. Supp. 3d 99, 107 (E.D. La. 2017) (holding that the swabbing
of a Hummer door constituted a Fourth Amendment search, but declining to rule
whether DNA analysis of the swab was a Fourth Amendment search); State v. Williford,
767 S.E.2d 139, 14445 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (finding that collection and analysis of a
discarded cigarette butt did not implicate the defendant’s constitutional rights); State
v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 37 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (concluding that police did not
violate the Fourth Amendment when they analyzed DNA collected from a sealed letter
addressed to their own detectives).
129. Tissue Led to Arrest, supra note 128.
130. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 125; see also Jacey Fortin, In Serial Rape Case that
Stumped Police, Genealogy Database Leads to Arrest, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/23/us/ramsey-street-rapist-dna.html;
Michella
Welch Killing: DNA in Genealogy Database Leads to Man’s Arrest in 1986 Cold Case, INSIDE
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enforcement may use the database.131 Some have recognized the
opportunities in this field of investigation. For instance, Parabon
Nanolabs was not involved in the Golden State Killer investigation, but
the company now offers a service to help law enforcement conduct
genetic testing and find a match in open source databases.132
The growth of private and open source DNA databases and
improvements in DNA technology also have significant implications
for how law enforcement may use DNA databases in the future. A
recent study found that approximately sixty percent of individuals of
European descent could be identified through familial matching in a
genetic database.133 As consumer genetic testing expands, it is likely
that nearly all individuals of European descent could be identified
through familial matching in consumer DNA databases in the near
future.134 The study also had implications for the identity of individuals
within genetic databases. Researchers in the study took a supposedly
anonymous DNA sample from a public dataset and uploaded it to
GEDmatch.135 With one day of work, the researchers were able to
identify the individual.136 Separately, another group of researchers

EDITION (June 22, 2018, 2:30 PM), https://www.insideedition.com/michella-welchkilling-dna-genealogy-database-leads-mans-arrest-1986-cold-case-44443.
131. See Zhang, supra note 51 (explaining that the creators of GEDmatch updated
its terms of service after learning that law enforcement had used the site in the Golden
State Killer investigation); see also supra note 121 and accompanying text.
132. See Murphy, supra note 125 (describing the collaboration between Parabon
NanoLabs and the Snohomish and Skagist County Sheriff offices in Washington); see
also Antonio Regalado & Brian Alexander, The Citizen Scientist Who Finds Killers from Her
Couch, MIT TECH. REV. (June 22, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s
/611529/the-citizen-scientist-who-finds-killers-from-her-couch (noting that the
Parabon Nanolabs unit is headed by a TV-famous geneticist).
133. Yaniv Erlich et al., Identity Inference of Genomic Data Using Long-Range Familial
Searches, 362 SCI. 690, 690 (2018).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 692–93. The study specifies individuals of “European descent,” defined
as Americans of European descent, are currently over-represented in most DNA
databases containing consumer testing data. See Brian Resnick, How Your Third Cousin’s
Ancestry DNA Test Could Jeopardize Your Privacy, VOX (Oct. 15, 2018, 10:20 AM),
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/10/12/17957268/science-ancestrydna-privacy. This over-representation of individuals of European descent stands in
contrast to most law enforcement-operated DNA databases, where individuals of
African and Hispanic descent are over-represented. See Brett Mares, A Chip off the Old
Block: Familial DNA Searches and the African American Community, 29 LAW & INEQ. 395,
407–09 (2011); Daniel J. Grimm, Note, The Demographics of Genetic Surveillance: Familial
DNA Testing and the Hispanic Community, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1175–80 (2007).
136. Id. at 693.

2019]

DNA DATABASES AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

1035

determined that it may be possible for law enforcement to use the data
from its own databases and compare it against SNP profiles on sites like
GEDmatch to identify close relatives.137 If law enforcement took
advantage of this technology, it could rapidly expand the reach of state
and federally run DNA databases like CODIS.
D. The Right to Privacy
The police practice of uploading a suspect’s DNA to a publicly
available website raises significant concerns about whether law
enforcement has infringed upon one or more of the suspect’s rights.138
The Supreme Court has established that individuals do have a
constitutional right to privacy, even though such a right is not explicitly
enumerated within the text of the Constitution. In Griswold v.
Connecticut,139 the Court recognized that the Constitution has certain
“penumbras” that emanate from other explicitly established rights and
give those rights “life and substance.”140 The Court recognized a right
to privacy in Griswold emanating from the First Amendment’s right to
association, the Third Amendment’s right to exclude soldiers from
quartering in the home, the Fourth Amendment’s right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Fifth Amendment’s right
to be free from self-incrimination.141 Additionally, the Court noted
that the Ninth Amendment provides that the enumerated rights of the
Constitution “shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people,”142 and used the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to apply this right of privacy to the states.143
The Court’s jurisprudence on the right to privacy protects two
separate interests: an “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters” and an “interest in independence in making certain

137. Jaehee Kim et al., Statistical Detection of Relatives Typed with Disjoint Forensic and
Biomedical Loci, 175 CELL 848, 848 (2018).
138. This Comment solely addresses concerns regarding the right to privacy, but there
are also important questions about the practice’s constitutionality under the Fourth
Amendment and the applicability of state laws that disallow familial DNA testing within the
state’s own databases. See, e.g., Natalie Ram, Incidental Informants: Police Can Use Genealogy
Databases to Help Identify Criminal Relatives—But Should They?, 51 MD. B.J. 8 (2018).
139. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
140. Id. at 484 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516–22 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
141. See id. (examining the “zones of privacy” created by the Bill of Rights).
142. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IX).
143. Id. at 481–82.
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kinds of important decisions.”144 In Whalen v. Roe,145 the Court describes
the right to avoid “disclosure of personal matters” as the interest
protected by the Court in its Griswold decision.146 In addition to the
reasoning in Griswold, the Court in Whalen also cited Justice Brandeis’s
dissent in Olmstead v. United States147 as upholding a right to privacy that
protects individuals from disclosure of certain personal information.148
In his Olmstead dissent, Justice Brandeis referred to a “right to be let
alone,” which he asserted was “the right most valued by civilized men.”149
In dicta, the Court has also recognized certain privacy rights of family
members. In National Archives and Records Administration v. Favish,150 the
Court stated that the family of a deceased individual has a privacy interest
in the details of the deceased’s death under both “cultural tradition” and
the common law.151 While the Court ultimately resolved the Favish case
on procedural grounds, the dicta in this case provides insight into how
the Court conceptualizes the privacy rights of family members.152
Additionally, in the Fourth Amendment context, courts generally
recognize that where multiple individuals have a privacy interest, consent
of all parties is required to waive a constitutional right.153
The Court has stated that an individual does not have a privacy
interest in certain areas, most notably in illegal activity.154 However, in
other areas, the Court has acknowledged an expanded privacy interest.

144. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977). The right to independently make
important decisions derives from the privacy interest established in Roe v. Wade, which
expanded the right to privacy to also include the right of a woman to make a decision
regarding abortion, in consultation with her doctor. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). Because
this Comment does not concern a private decision made by an individual, but rather a
practice used by the government that implicates an individual’s privacy rights, this
Comment will not discuss this particular branch of privacy rights jurisprudence.
145. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
146. Id. at 599 n.25.
147. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
148. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 n.25.
149. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
150. 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
151. Id. at 168–70.
152. Id. at 165, 174.
153. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 114 (2006) (stating that when a cotenant objects to a search, even though another co-tenant consents, the objection
overrules the consent).
154. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–09 (2005) (“We have held that any
interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed ‘legitimate,’ and thus, governmental
conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband ‘compromises no legitimate privacy
interest.’” (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984))).
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In recent years, the Court has had to address privacy in the context of
a changing world.
Technology has drastically changed what
information law enforcement can obtain and use in the criminal justice
context. This section will address how the Court has handled
expansions in technology in the Fourth Amendment context.155 While
this Comment addresses the right to privacy and not Fourth
Amendment rights, the Court has explicitly noted that the right to
privacy derives in part from the guarantees set forth in the Fourth
Amendment.156 Thus, the privacy interests protected by the Court in
the Fourth Amendment context also implicate which interests are
protected in the right to privacy context. This section then addresses
the right to privacy in the context of the state disclosing sensitive
information, particularly sensitive medical information.157
1.

Privacy and technology
In addition to famously recognizing the “right to be let alone,”
Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead also warned that as technology
develops, the “progress of science” could provide the government with
more ways to violate the Fourth Amendment rights of its citizens.158 As
modern technology has developed, the Supreme Court has
increasingly extended privacy rights to cover the privacy invasions
presented by new technology.159 In the Fourth Amendment context,
the Supreme Court has expanded protections to cell phone location
data provided to a third party, examining the contents of a cell phone,
and scanning an individual’s home with a heat sensor.160
In deciding each of these cases, the Supreme Court found that changes
in technology—and the way that the technology is commonly used in
society—can change how “private” society perceives the information. For
instance, in Riley v. California,161 the Court noted that smartphones are
now an integral part of most adults’ daily lives in a way that cell phones

155. See infra Section I.D.1.
156. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965).
157. See infra Section I.D.2.
158. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
159. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (cell phone
tracking data); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (heat sensors); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967) (recording device in phone booth).
160. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223; Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95
(2014); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40–41.
161. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
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were not just a couple decades ago.162 Similarly, in Kyllo v. United States,163
the Court found that while law enforcement may legally observe a home
from a public street, enhancing the senses through the use of a heat
detector was an impermissible invasion of privacy which required a
warrant.164 Taken together, these Fourth Amendment cases demonstrate
that constitutional rights are interpreted in the context of modern
technology, particularly where that technology presents a further invasion
into the intimate parts of an individual’s life.165
2.

Privacy and DNA
The Supreme Court has thus far not dealt extensively with how
expanding technology use applies in the context of DNA analysis. In
one of only a handful of cases addressing DNA, King,166 the Court held
that law enforcement may take DNA from an individual arrested for a
crime.167 However, in King, the Court focused on the physical taking
of the DNA itself via a buccal swab of the arrestee’s mouth as the
“search” within the context of the Fourth Amendment, not the later
DNA testing and analysis of that swab.168 The Court also recognized
that the DNA sample taken from the arrestee would only be used to
establish the arrestee’s identity, not to explore further data that could
potentially be revealed through DNA testing.169
While some state courts have found that a DNA test is a search
separate from the search collecting the DNA sample, federal courts
have followed the reasoning set forth by the Court in King.170 Some
lower federal courts have reasoned that because suspects of crime do
not have privacy rights to their identity, and traditional DNA testing
used by law enforcement only reveals information related to a suspect’s
identity, DNA testing is not a search for the purposes of the Fourth

162. Id. at 2484.
163. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
164. Id. at 34–36.
165. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484–85 (examining how to interpret modern cell phone
use by balancing government interests against the degree of privacy intrusion).
166. 569 U.S. 435 (2013).
167. Id. at 465–66.
168. Id. at 446.
169. See id. at 450–51 (equating the practice of using DNA swabs with the common
practices of using wanted posters, tattoos, or fingerprints to identify an arrestee).
170. Compare Patterson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 4, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a DNA
test is a separate search), with Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 67–68 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding
that testing a DNA sample is not a separate search under the Fourth Amendment).
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Amendment.171 Because law enforcement use of SNP testing is
relatively new and has not yet faced legal challenges, courts have not
ruled on how this more sophisticated and revealing form of DNA
testing applies in the privacy or Fourth Amendment context.172
3.

Privacy and medical information
The Supreme Court has not specifically ruled upon the issue of public
officials releasing private genetic information about a suspect.173
However, precedent from the Court sheds light on how it conceptualizes
government use of personal medical information. Additionally, lower
court decisions regarding the release of medical information of
prisoners present an analogue for how courts may conceptualize the
release of an individual’s DNA data. While the Court acknowledges in
many of the cases noted in this section that an individual has a reduced
expectation of privacy in certain situations, the Court does not state in
any case that a right is wholly inapplicable to a particular individual.
This is because an individual still retains his constitutional rights even
when he has a reduced expectation of privacy.174
The Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding drug testing sheds
light on how the Court handles cases where private information about
an individual may be revealed through testing of bodily fluids.
Generally, the Court has been more permissive of testing in situations
where the individual has a reduced expectation of privacy or where the

171. See Boroian, 616 F.3d at 66 (“CODIS currently functions much like a traditional
fingerprint database, permitting law enforcement to match one identification record
against others contained in the database.”); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 499
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (comparing CODIS to an “old-fashioned fingerprint database” used
only for identifying individuals).
172. See generally Matt Ford, How the Supreme Court Could Rewrite the Rules for DNA
Searches, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 30, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/148170/
supreme-court-rewrite-rules-dna-searches (discussing how this new police practice of
uploading DNA could change the Supreme Court’s DNA jurisprudence).
173. The closest case analogous to police releasing private information about a
suspect is Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999), in which the Court held that police had
violated an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights by bringing members of the media
along while police executed a search warrant in an individual’s home. Id. at 614.
However, this decision was limited and based heavily on the facts of the case at hand
and did not prevent the media from joining law enforcement during the execution of
a search warrant in all situations. Id.
174. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758–60 (1985) (discussing a suspect’s Fourth
Amendment rights, which the suspect retains despite a reduced expectation of privacy).
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test is less invasive.175 In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,176 a case
challenging a school district’s policy of drug-testing student athletes,
the Court found for the school district, reasoning that the school’s
custodial relationship with the students and the students’ diminished
expectation of privacy at school made the drug testing policy
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.177 The Court also found for
the government in a case challenging a Federal Railroad Administration
regulation that permitted drug testing of railroad employees.178 In
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass’n,179 the Court recognized that the
compelling interest in ensuring that employees were drug-free
outweighed the potential intrusion on the employees’ privacy.180
However, in a case involving breath testing and blood testing of drunk
drivers during the course of arrest, the Court permitted the state to use
breath testing during a search incident to arrest but required a warrant
for a blood test due to the invasive nature of the testing.181
The Court has implicitly acknowledged that the government releasing
private medical information about individuals may implicate a privacy
right. In Whalen, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the state
compelling pharmacies to track purchases of otherwise legal drugs.182
The Court recognized a compelling state interest in tracking legal sales of
drugs that may be used to make illegal substances.183 Ultimately, the
175. The Court has recognized that individuals have a reduced expectation of
privacy in a number of contexts, including when an individual shares information with
a third party, when an individual is a student at a public school, when an individual is
operating a vehicle, and when an individual is arrested for a crime. See Carpenter v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (third parties); Maryland v. King, 569 U.S.
435, 463 (2013) (arrestees); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) (vehicle
passengers and drivers); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995)
(student athletes). Additionally, the Court has found that an individual does not have
a privacy right in “abandoned” items or items exposed to public view. See California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (trash exposed to public not protected by
privacy rights); Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 566 (1968) (White, J.,
dissenting) (“Of course ‘abandoned’ property may be seized . . . .”).
176. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
177. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 656–57.
178. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989).
179. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
180. Id. at 624.
181. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016) (“Because breath
tests are significantly less intrusive than blood tests and in most cases amply serve law
enforcement interests, we conclude that a breath test, but not a blood test, may be
administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving.” (emphasis added)).
182. 429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977).
183. Id. at 597–98.
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Court ruled in favor of the state, but acknowledged that the state
computer files used to store the data were vulnerable, and declined to
rule on any questions regarding the “disclosure of accumulated private
data,” whether such disclosure was “intentional or unintentional.”184
One area where lower courts have recognized a privacy interest is in
the disclosure of a prisoner’s HIV or transgender status. For example,
in 1994 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit first
recognized a prisoner’s privacy interest in HIV status in Doe v. City of
New York.185 The Second Circuit later addressed that same right in
Powell v. Schriver,186 holding that a prisoner, while deprived of many
constitutional freedoms when incarcerated, nonetheless retains a right
to privacy in her HIV and transgender status.187 Although the Second
Circuit ultimately found that the government officials had qualified
immunity for the release of information about the prisoner in Powell,
the court acknowledged that a prisoner has some privacy interest in
her HIV and transgender status that may remain protected even while
she is incarcerated.188 Other federal courts have also found disclosures
of a prisoner’s HIV status to violate a prisoner’s right to privacy in his
medical information, although most of these cases also resulted in
qualified immunity for the prison officials.189
Taken together, these cases indicate that while a diminished
expectation of privacy in certain information can permit the government
to collect certain personal information, the invasiveness of the testing
process matters when analyzing the privacy interests of an individual. The
cases concerning medical information build upon this rule by establishing
that even in situations where an individual has a reduced expectation of
privacy, such as in the case of imprisoned individuals, an individual retains

184. Id. at 605–06.
185. 15 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1994).
186. 175 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1999).
187. See id. at 111–13 (accepting that the right to privacy in medical information
exists for incarcerated prisoners, but explaining that such a right may be impinged if
related to a legitimate penological interest, but not if used as humor or gossip).
188. Id. at 113–14.
189. See Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1175, 1180 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that
disclosure of HIV status was a violation of a constitutional right, but offering qualified
immunity because the right was not yet clearly defined); Doe, 15 F.3d at 267
(recognizing that there is a right to “confidentiality” that is distinguishable from right
to autonomy and decision making, and finding that this right is violated by disclosing
confidential information such as a prisoner’s HIV status); see also Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d
309, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that prison officials had qualified immunity, but
recognizing that a prisoner has a privacy interest in his HIV status).
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at least some privacy interest which protects against the release of sensitive
information to outside parties. Part II of this Comment addresses these
rules in the context of law enforcement uploading the results of an
invasive DNA test to a public website.
II. ANALYSIS
As established in the previous sections, modern DNA testing allows
law enforcement to learn far more information about an individual
than simply the individual’s identity. This Comment argues that a
suspect and his blood relatives have a right to privacy in the DNA data
that goes beyond the individual’s identity to sensitive traits, and that
law enforcement violates this privacy right by uploading the data to a
public DNA database. This section will first explore how this law
enforcement practice violates the right to privacy of the suspect himself
by releasing sensitive information, particularly medical information,
about the suspect.190 This section will then address the privacy rights
implications of this practice on individuals related to the suspect,
whose medical history may also be disclosed through the uploading of
a relative’s genetic data.191 Ultimately, this section will argue that
because innocent third parties who are related to the suspect do not
have a diminished expectation in their privacy, the practice of uploading
a relative’s DNA violates the family’s right to privacy in their own genetic
data because the family members share DNA with the suspect.192
A.

The Suspect’s Right to Privacy

When an individual is suspected of a crime and not yet convicted, he
retains the rights guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution.193 While the
Supreme Court has recognized that there are areas and circumstances
that reduce an individual’s right to privacy,194 these circumstances do not
extinguish this right entirely.195 However, in the context of investigating
an unknown DNA sample, the “suspect” and his rights are difficult to
190. See infra Section II.A.
191. See infra Section II.B.
192. See infra Section II.B.
193. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758–60 (1985) (discussing the suspect’s
right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment,
a right which the Court assumes the suspect retains even while suspected of a crime).
194. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2177 (2016) (stating that arrest
necessarily diminishes the privacy expectations of the individual).
195. See Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 316–17 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that incarcerated
individuals retain some rights to privacy, although those rights may be subject to limitations).
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define, as the individual has not yet been identified by law enforcement.
Law enforcement certainly has a compelling interest in finding the
identity of that individual, but even compelling state interests have certain
limits.196 In the sections that follow, this Comment argues that a suspect
has a privacy interest in the intimate information contained within
sophisticated DNA test results, and that law enforcement violates this right
to privacy by uploading the DNA data to a public website where an
unknown number of users could obtain the data.
1.

Modern technology
As discussed above, an individual’s DNA contains a vast amount of
information because DNA is the “blueprint” for the human body to
make the proteins that define how an individual’s body looks and
functions.197 The amount of information revealed by a DNA test,
however, is dependent on the type of DNA test that is performed on
the DNA sample.198 A DNA test could solely target non-coding regions
of DNA, which would help establish a code that can be compared for
identity purposes with another DNA sample, but would not be useful
in establishing any further information about the individual.199 A more
sophisticated DNA test, such as an SNP test, could reveal far more
information, establishing not only a code that informs the tester of an
individual’s identity, but also reveals sensitive information about the
individual, such as race, ethnicity, or potential to develop a number of
different genetically-linked diseases.200
Advances in technology can greatly impact how courts perceive a
violation of privacy rights.201 Something that previously held only some
personal data, such as a cell phone’s location, can rapidly become far
more significant in daily life and therefore present an area where
society recognizes a privacy interest, even if there may not have been a
privacy interest in that area before.202 Thus, while DNA testing has
been less intrusive in the past, modern technology permits law
enforcement to intrude far more into a suspect’s medical and genetic

196. See, e.g., supra notes 185–89 and accompanying text (discussing that a prisoner
has a privacy interest in his HIV status which overrides the state interest in his HIV status).
197. See CUTICCHIA supra note 26 and accompanying text.
198. See supra Section I.A.2.
199. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text.
202. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216–19 (2018).

1044

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1015

information than ever before.203 Some of these SNP tests can reveal
medical information, such as a risk for breast cancer, Parkinson’s
disease, and diabetes, all of which may be linked to certain genetic
traits.204 Additionally, even a basic DNA test can reveal the sex of an
individual at birth.205 Given that the Second Circuit has already
recognized a right to confidentiality with regard to an individual’s
transgender identity, releasing information from a DNA sample could
violate an individual’s right to privacy by releasing sensitive information
about his gender identity.206
In Carpenter and Riley, the Supreme Court also recognized that cell
phone technology will only continue to become more sophisticated in
the future.207 The Court recognized that as cell phone technology
becomes more integrated into people’s lives, the more sensitive
information can be revealed by a search of the phone.208 In Carpenter,
the Court explicitly stated that its ruling would only become more
important as the ability to pinpoint an individual’s location via his cell
phone becomes more sophisticated.209 The same is true for hackers
targeting websites.210 As companies develop new ways to protect
information, individuals who seek to gain access learn new ways to
unlawfully obtain the information.211 Additionally, a recent study
203. See Justin Jouvenal, The Unlikely Crime-Fighter Cracking Decades-Old Murders? A
Genealogist., WASH. POST (July 16, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/publicsafety/in-decades-old-crimes-considered-all-but-unsolvable-genetic-genealogy-bringsflurry-of-arrests/2018/07/16/241f0e6a-68f6-11e8-bf8c-f9ed2e672adf
(noting
that
modern DNA testing websites, such as GEDmatch, have DNA profiles containing over
600,000 SNPs, allowing users “not only to identify a match but also to determine how
closely people are related”).
204. See Saey, supra note 56 (discussing the health information provided by
23andMe and other online DNA testing services).
205. See CUTICCHIA, supra note 26, at 8 (illustrating that biological males have XY
chromosomes, while biological females have XX chromosomes).
206. See Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 111–12 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding that a
prisoner has the right to maintain privacy in her “transsexual” and HIV status while
incarcerated, subject only to “legitimate penological interests”).
207. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218; Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484–85 (2014).
208. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485.
209. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
210. See Nick Miroff, Hacking, Cyberattacks Now the Biggest Threat to U.S., Trump’s
Homeland Security Chief Warns, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.washington
post.com/world/national-security/hacking-cyberattacks-now-the-biggest-threat-to-ustrumps-homeland-security-chief-warns/2018/09/05/d0045800-b119-11e8-a20b5f4f84429666 (discussing the threat of hacking in the national security context).
211. See, e.g., Angela Chen, Why a DNA Data Breach Is Much Worse Than a Credit Card
Leak, VERGE (June 6, 2018, 3:54 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/6/1743
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indicates that it is possible, with some knowledge and expertise, for an
outside individual to identify a previously “anonymous” set of genetic
data.212 This indicates that if law enforcement can use a pubic database
to identify a suspect, citizen sleuths may be able to in turn identify
which set of genetic data belongs to a particular suspect, even if law
enforcement attempted to conceal the identity of the suspect when
uploading the DNA to a public website.
In a DNA database operated by law enforcement, there are protocols
regarding how DNA is tested, who can test the DNA, and who has
access to the information stored in the database.213 Law enforcement
databases are used to solve crimes and are not available to the general
public.214 Thus, while an individual cannot know for sure who is
accessing his DNA stored in a law enforcement database, he can
generally be sure that the information will only be viewed by
authorized officials. However, when law enforcement turns over a
suspect’s DNA data to a public open source DNA database such as
GEDmatch, it turns over all of its ability to control who may have access
to that information. Even though law enforcement may make its best
effort to keep the data it uploads anonymous, it has no means of
knowing if the data will be kept anonymous in the future. The
protections regarding access and accountability that are established by
statute in the case of state and federal DNA databases are simply not
present in the world of open source data.
Advances in DNA technology, coupled with the rise of online DNA
databases, allow law enforcement to obtain more sensitive data about
a suspect than ever before. Yet, once law enforcement uploads a
suspect’s DNA information to a public DNA website, they have little
control over how the data is used or who may access it. However, if a
suspect has no privacy right in the genetic information released by law
enforcement, then there would be no violation of the suspect’s rights.
The next section explores why a suspect has a privacy right in the
genetic information uploaded by law enforcement.

5166/myheritage-dna-breach-genetic-privacy-bioethics (discussing a breach of 92
million user accounts on a DNA database website).
212. See Yaniv Erlich et al., Identity Inference of Genomic Data Using Long-Range Familial
Searches, 362 SCI. 690, 692–93 (2018) (finding that scientists could identify a previously
anonymous individual by searching genetic data GEDmatch and using public records).
213. See supra Section I.B.1 (describing the requirements for testing DNA to include
the sample in federal databases).
214. See CODIS and NDIS FAQs, supra note 64 (stating that “[a]ccess is restricted to
criminal justice agencies for law enforcement identification purposes”).

1046

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1015

2.

A privacy interest in DNA test results
As discussed above, the technologies used to test DNA in preparation
for uploading to GEDmatch are far more intrusive than the other
forms of DNA testing used by law enforcement and go far beyond
simply assisting law enforcement in identifying a suspect.215 To prepare
a DNA sample to be uploaded to a genetic database, law enforcement
must test the DNA in a manner akin to that of private, direct-toconsumer companies like Ancestry or 23andMe.216 The DNA loci used
in this kind of SNP testing can reveal far more information than the
traditional DNA tests run by law enforcement for inclusion in
CODIS.217 Exactly what tests law enforcement uses in preparation for
uploading a DNA profile to a public website, and exactly which loci are
used in the testing process, have not been publicly disclosed. Thus,
DNA testing done by law enforcement when preparing to upload a
DNA profile to an open source database can potentially reveal sensitive
medical information. Due to a lack of law enforcement transparency,
the extent of the information revealed by that test may be difficult for
the public to determine.218 However, even without knowing the full
panel of loci used by law enforcement,219 this more invasive DNA test
would necessarily include information regarding the individual’s
ancestry, and potentially information relating to genetically-linked
diseases as well.220 This is in stark contrast to how law enforcement uses
its own databases, where the DNA must be tested in a manner clearly
delineated and made publicly available by federal agencies.221
Additionally, the DNA loci tested by law enforcement for inclusion in
a law enforcement database do not test for any sensitive information.222
The privacy interests in information protected by the federal courts
are analogous to the information at risk of disclosure when law
enforcement uploads DNA data to a public website. In Doe and Powell,

215. See supra notes 54–56 (discussing the data collected in SNP testing).
216. See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.
218. In contrast, CODIS’s website explicitly states which loci are used in the testing
process for inclusion in the DNA index. See CODIS and NDIS FAQs, supra note 64.
https://snapshot.parabon219. See
Parabon
Snapshot,
PARABON NANOLABS,
nanolabs.com/#genealogy-how (last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (describing a service for law
enforcement that provides SNP testing for DNA samples, but not disclosing which loci are used).
220. 23ANDME, supra note 96.
221. See CODIS and NDIS FAQs, supra note 64 (describing the process for testing and
storing DNA in federal databases).
222. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
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the Second Circuit recognized privacy interests of prisoners who were
HIV positive.223 The Second Circuit in Doe reasoned that the right to
privacy extended to “information about the state of one’s health.”224
The Second Circuit further recognized the stigma of HIV and
transgender status and the potential for harassment or harm if that
information released publicly in its decision in Powell.225 While DNA
testing cannot definitively state that an individual will get a particular
disease, it can establish that the individual has a higher likelihood of
developing such a disease.226 Thus, under the reasoning of Doe and
Powell, the individual has a privacy interest in that sensitive health
information and should be permitted, within reason, to control when
and to whom that information is disclosed.
While the government is permitted to possess sensitive information,
this does not mean the government may freely release that information
to the public. In Whalen, the Supreme Court recognized that the state
government may mandate the disclosure to the state’s Department of
Health of which individuals had been prescribed Schedule II
substances.227 The Court reasoned that despite the appellees’ assertion
that the data was insecure, there was no reason for the “assumption
that the security provisions of the statute will be administered
improperly.”228 However, the law enforcement practice of uploading a
suspect’s DNA data to a public website is an explicit release of the
suspect’s information. The entire practice is predicated on the release
of the information, instead of a potential incidental effect of collecting
the data. Thus, while law enforcement may have a right to test the
crime scene DNA to collect additional data,229 the subsequent public
release of that data would violate the suspect’s right to privacy.
A diminished privacy interest in some data does not give law
enforcement a blanket license to release whatever information they
want in pursuit of finding a suspect. In the school drug-testing case,
223. See supra notes 185–88 and accompanying text (discussing Doe and Powell).
224. 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994).
225. Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 115 (2d Cir. 1999) (acknowledging dangers
of releasing HIV and transgender status in discussion of Eighth Amendment rights).
226. See Saey, supra note 56 (indicating that DNA testing can reveal increased risk
of Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s disease, or breast cancer).
227. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–602 (1977).
228. Id. at 600, 601.
229. Supra notes 166–69 and accompanying text. For an argument that a suspect
should retain privacy rights in DNA shed at crime scenes, see David Gusella, Note, No
Cilia Left Behind: Analyzing the Privacy Rights in Routinely Shed DNA Found at Crime Scenes,
54 B.C. L. REV. 789 (2013).
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Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the Court’s analysis of the students’
privacy interest relied in part on what the testing itself revealed.230 The
Court stated that the drug testing procedure revealed only whether or
not the student had used illegal drugs, and not whether the student
was “for example, epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.”231 Similarly, in
Skinner, a case concerning drug testing of public employees, the Court
recognized that the urine testing may reveal medical facts about the
individual, but nonetheless permitted the practice based on the need
to test for drugs quickly and the dire consequences of allowing
individuals under the influence of drugs operate railway equipment.232
The privacy interest at risk in the uploading of a DNA test is
distinguishable from these instances. While an individual who has
committed a crime does not have a privacy right in his illegal activity,233
this does not preclude the individual from having a privacy right in
other areas of his life. Unlike in Vernonia School District, where the
testing only revealed the illegal activity of the students, the testing
performed by law enforcement may reveal extensive information
outside of law enforcement’s intended purpose to identify the
suspect.234 Additionally, the purpose of the drug-testing policy in
Skinner was to prevent railway accidents.235 However, in the case of
crime scene DNA, the crime and the harm has already occurred. While
law enforcement certainly has an interest in identifying a suspect as
soon as possible, the courts may be more inclined to impose
procedural safeguards in this instance.
Some may argue that the suspect, by leaving his DNA at the scene of
a crime, has effectively “abandoned” the DNA sample or exposed the
sample to the public and therefore does not retain any privacy interest
in the DNA sample at all. While some states and lower federal courts
have recognized this reasoning as the rule,236 the Supreme Court has
not definitively answered whether a suspect releases all privacy in DNA
shed at a crime scene. In addition, the reasoning behind the Court’s
decision in Greenwood, which concerned trash in public view on the
street, was that an individual’s trash is available and accessible to the
230. See 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995).
231. Id.
232. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617, 619–21 (1989); see also
supra notes 178–80 and accompanying text.
233. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–09 (2005).
234. See supra notes 54–56, 125–29.
235. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620.
236. See supra note 128.
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public once placed curbside.237 While a DNA sample may be left behind,
the information contained within the DNA sample is not readily
viewable by the public and requires a significant amount of scientific
testing which the average member of the public does not have access to.
Additionally, SNP testing on a large commercial scale is a relatively
recent occurrence.238 The fact that the loci used by law enforcement do
not reveal any sensitive information about the suspect has been noted in
some courts’ opinions on the abandonment issue as part of the court’s
reasoning in permitting the practice of testing “abandoned” DNA.239 In
this evolving area of technology, the Court’s precedents may not hold in
the face of such invasive use of DNA testing technology.
Additionally, the practice of testing an individual’s DNA may lead to
stigma or discrimination of other kinds. SNP testing can reveal very specific
information about an individual’s race and ancestral national origin.240
This potentially opens the door for law enforcement officers to unfairly
stereotype or profile individuals based on a suspect’s genetic profile.
An individual has a privacy interest in his medical information, and
SNP testing is capable of revealing such information. While law
enforcement may permissibly run such a genetic test on DNA found at
a crime scene because of the suspect’s reduced expectation of privacy,
law enforcement cannot upload the data to a public website without
violating the privacy rights of the individual to whom the DNA belongs.
Once uploaded, law enforcement loses all ability to control who may
have access to that data and potentially shares sensitive genetic
information about a suspect with the public.
B.

The Suspect’s Family’s Right to Privacy

In addition to the suspect’s right to privacy in his own genetic material,
the process of uploading a suspect’s DNA may also implicate members of
his family. This section first describes the implications of the unavoidable
sharing of DNA between family members,241 and then argues that the
family members’ privacy rights in their own genetic material is violated
when law enforcement uploads the genetic testing data of a relative.242
237. 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988).
238. See supra notes 97–111 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 755 (Md. 2014) (finding that the testing
of “13 identifying ‘junk’ loci,” without a physical intrusion on the body, was not a
search under the Fourth Amendment).
240. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.
241. See infra Section II.B.1.
242. See infra Section II.B.2.
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1.

Shared DNA between biologically related individuals
As noted above, related individuals can share a significant amount of
the same DNA.243 Parents and children share exactly half of the same
DNA, and close relatives share a substantial percentage of the same DNA
as well.244 Thus, knowing the genetic background of one individual can
implicate the genetic background of his close relatives. Additionally,
some medical diseases often run in families and are genetically linked.245
An individual’s likelihood of getting these genetically-linked diseases
can be detected by testing DNA.246
In the context of uploading a suspect’s DNA to a public website, law
enforcement must also find a match to one of the suspect’s genetic
relatives in order to trace the suspect’s family tree.247 These genetic
relatives have made an active choice to upload their own DNA profiles
to an open source website, functionally placing their genetic
information in “public view” and, thus, opening their DNA profile to
police scrutiny under the reasoning of Greenwood.248 However, after
matching a suspect’s DNA to a genetic relative, law enforcement will
use public records to investigate the known match’s family tree and
identify the suspect.249 While currently an opaque process, this would
likely involve law enforcement identifying many other individuals
related to the suspect, including close relatives such as parents or
children of the suspect.250 These other genetic relatives may have
never openly released their DNA to public or law enforcement
scrutiny. The consent of the genetic relative who uploaded his DNA
sample cannot also be used as consent for all members of his family to
release information about the family genetic line.251 Nevertheless, this
may allow law enforcement to obtain sensitive information about the
relative’s genetic makeup, by virtue of analyzing the genetic makeup
of the suspect, without ever possessing the relative’s DNA.
243. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (discussing the average amount
of DNA shared between relatives).
244. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
245. See Saey, supra note 56 (explaining how genetic testing can reveal likelihood of
breast cancer).
246. Id.
247. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 112–16.
249. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
251. Cf. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 114–15 (2006) (finding in the Fourth
Amendment context that one occupant of a home may not give consent for a search
if another occupant is present and objecting to the search).
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Additionally, as law enforcement uses the practice of uploading a
suspect’s DNA to a publicly available database grows, questions of
consent become even further complicated. It is unclear right now
whether law enforcement deletes the DNA information of the suspect
from the public database once law enforcement has obtained the
familial information it needs to identify the suspect.
If law
enforcement leaves the suspect’s genetic profile on the public
database, then that profile becomes public information for other law
enforcement agencies to search when looking for a suspect. If a
second law enforcement agency makes an arrest based on genetic
information uploaded by the first law enforcement agency that the
suspect never consented to making public, the same consent argument
noted above would not hold.
Should this practice become
commonplace, the further use of uploaded genetic information for
other purposes is an important consideration for law enforcement.
2.

Privacy rights of innocent third parties
Relatives of a criminal suspect do not give up their privacy rights
simply because of a genetic link to the suspect. Thus, innocent third
parties do not have a diminished expectation of privacy in their genetic
data in the same way that someone who has committed an illegal act
would.252 In most other instances, such as drug-testing or revealing an
individual’s HIV status, the information is generally specific to one person
and does not implicate any outside parties. However, this is not the case
in the context of genetic material. Knowing that a woman has a genetic
marker that increases risk for breast cancer, for instance, necessarily
indicates that her daughter may have inherited the same gene.253
While not every relative will share every trait with the suspect, the
implication of shared genetic material alone could be enough to
damage the reputation of a related individual. In Favish, the Supreme
Court recognized a family’s privacy interest in information about a
deceased relative.254 The family members in Favish sought to protect
their own interests in securing “refuge from a sensation-seeking
252. See supra Section II.A; cf. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665
(1995) (stating that while the Court upheld suspicionless drug testing in some
situations, it would likely not permit suspicionless searches in circumstance where the
individuals being searched did not have a diminished expectation of privacy).
253. See Genetics, BREASTCANCER.ORG, https://www.breastcancer.org/risk/factors/
genetics (last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (asserting that “[a]bout 5% to 10% of breast cancers
are thought to be hereditary, . . . passed from parent to child”).
254. 541 U.S. 157, 168–69 (2004).
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culture for their own peace of mind and tranquility.”255 While the
Court ultimately drew its conclusions regarding privacy in Favish from
the text of the statute, the Court also recognized that intrusions on
these privacy rights were “long deemed impermissible under the common
law and in our cultural traditions.”256 Favish indicates that family
members, in a situation where public pressure is applied to them based
on the actions of a related individual, have a privacy right in protecting
their lives from outside scrutiny.257 When officers release an individual’s
DNA to the public, they invite scrutiny of those closely related to the
accused in one of the most sensitive ways possible by revealing
information that may bear on the family’s collective medical history.
Thus, when law enforcement uploads a suspect’s DNA to a public
open source DNA database, law enforcement also reveals information
regarding the suspect’s relatives.258 Because the privacy rights of
innocent family members not suspected of a crime are not tempered
by any diminished expectation of privacy, the release of this
information violates a privacy right in the relatives’ genetic data.
CONCLUSION
DNA testing technology has grown vastly more sophisticated in
recent years, and law enforcement has chosen to use this newly
available technology to track down suspects in cold cases. Additionally,
given the success of this technology in solving cold cases, law
enforcement may decide to use this technology in more types of cases.
While the goal of bringing criminals to justice is certainly laudable, law
enforcement must exercise caution when using open source DNA
databases and not abuse the powerful information that it can now
obtain. The technology used by law enforcement currently presents a
significant intrusion into not only the potential suspect’s right to
privacy, but the right to privacy of individuals related to him as well.
Uploading a suspect’s genetic information to a website that cannot
guarantee privacy of that data is a violation of both the suspect’s right
to privacy in his medical information as well as the right to privacy of
individuals related to that suspect.

255. Id. at 166.
256. Id. at 167.
257. Id.
258. See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text (discussing the amount of
genetic information shared between biologically related individuals).

